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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper describes the results of a recent (July-August 2010 and July 2011) 
planetary surface traverse planning experiment. The purpose of this experiment was 
to gather data relevant to robotically repositioning surface assets used for planetary 
surface exploration.  This is a scenario currently being considered for future human 
exploration missions to the Moon and Mars. The specific scenario selected was a 
robotic traverse on the lunar surface from an outpost at Shackleton Crater to the 
Malapert Massif. As these are exploration scenarios, the route will not have been 
previously traversed and the only pre-traverse data sets available will be remote 
(orbital) observations. 
Devon Island was selected as an analog location where a traverse route of 
significant length could be planned and then traveled. During the first half of 2010, a 
team of engineers and scientists who had never been to Devon Island used remote 
sensing data comparable to that which is likely to be available for the Malapert region 
(eg., 2-meter/pixel imagery, 10-meter interval topographic maps and associated 
digital elevation models, etc.) to plan a 17-kilometer (km) traverse. Surface-level 
imagery data was then gathered on-site that was provided to the planning team.  This 
team then assessed whether the route was actually traversable or not. 
Lessons learned during the 2010 experiment were then used in a second 
experiment in 2011 for which a much longer traverse (85 km) was planned and 
additional surface-level imagery different from that gathered in 2010 was obtained for 
a comparative analysis. 
This paper will describe the route planning techniques used, the data sets 
available to the route planners and the lessons learned from the two traverses planned 
and carried out on Devon Island. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper describes the results from several field tests of an approach for 
planning and carrying out a robotic traverse across many tens to hundreds of 
kilometers of a planetary surface. These tests included not only the processes to be 
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used, but considered the minimum data sets necessary to support these processes. The 
traverse scenario was focused somewhat narrowly on relocating assets (e.g., rovers, 
habitats, power sources, etc.) necessary for human crews to explore lunar sites for 
relatively short periods of time. The experiment team hypothesized that remotely 
sensed data – such as panchromatic and monochromatic imagery, elevation and radar 
– with a resolution no better than that which will be available from the Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) will be sufficient for planning these traverses and then 
carrying out the teleoperated movement of these large and valuable assets. 
After describing some background to help explain the origin of questions that 
lead to this experiment, the paper will discuss details associated with a 2010 field test 
and a follow-on test in 2011. Both tests were carried out near the Haughton Mars 
Project Research Station (HMPRS) located on Devon Island in northern Canada, a 
site with terrain features comparable to those expected to be found at sites of interest 
on the Moon and for which appropriate data sets are available. 
Background. In late 2008 it became clear that many space agencies were 
engaged in plans and preparations for missions beyond low-Earth orbit that could 
benefit from early coordination. As a result, the International Space Exploration 
Coordination Group (ISECG) was formed. In early 2009 the ISECG endorsed 
development of a Reference Architecture for Human Lunar Exploration and invited 
interested agencies to participate (Anon., 2009). To further the goal of cooperation, 
the ISECG established the International Architecture Working Group (IAWG) and 
the International Objectives Working Group (IOWG) to analyze the lunar exploration 
objectives of participating agencies. A series of workshops conducted during 2009 led 
to the development of a set of common lunar exploration goals. These goals were 
accepted by the ISECG in December 2009. A set of strategic guidelines was 
combined with these goals to guide another working group in the development of a 
reference architecture that was adopted by the ISECG (Anon., July 2010). 
This reference architecture is composed of four phases during which a range of 
international human-rated and robotic technologies will be deployed over time on the 
lunar surface. It also provides for continuous robotic and human exploration activity 
in multiple locations on the Moon. The four phases include: 
(1) Robotic precursor phase: Provides early technology demonstrations and 
engagement among international partners, the scientific community, and the public. It 
highlights important activities intended to reduce the risks associated with human 
missions and to ensure sustainability of the architecture. 
(2) Polar exploration and system validation phase: Initiates human exploration 
of the Moon. It leverages the robotic precursor work to deploy and test an 
international fleet of crewed rovers and supporting robots in preparation for more 
aggressive human and robotic lunar exploration. 
(3) Polar relocation phase: Relocates the fleet of robots and rovers, controlled 
from Earth, from the pole to new sites of interest. Along the way, this fleet will 
perform scientific studies and enable interactive participation from the public. Once 
in place, the robots and rovers meet and assist human crews landing at each new site. 
(4) Nonpolar relocation and long-duration phase: May involve multiple short 
missions to various lunar sites of interest or long-duration missions of about 70 days 
at one site. 
A specific scenario developed during formulation of the “polar relocation 
phase” of this reference architecture – an approximately 200-kilometer traverse from 
the rim of Shackleton Crater to the Malapert Massif – was used to guide the 
development of the field tests described in this paper. These field tests did not 
replicate the Shackleton-to-Malapert traverse in detail but took into account those 
features of the traverse (e.g., transitioning across rolling terrain, using rock outcrops 
as waypoints and scientific targets, transitioning around the rim of a crater, etc.) that 
were noted by the planners as they considered alternative means of completing their 
representative “polar relocation.” 
Three specific issues related to the traverse planning and execution aspect of 
this scenario were selected for analog field tests (Note: NASA/TM-2011-216157 
contains a complete discussion of these tests and the results): 
(1) The available remote observation data sets of a region to be traversed are 
sufficient for planning primary and alternate traverse routes (named TRPF-H1). 
(2) Robotically implemented traverse route execution will require surface-level 
imagery to identify and maneuver around local hazards/obstacles (named TRPF-H2).  
(3) Route-traversing efficiency will improve in direct proportion to the number 
of surface-level imagery sources used to support a traverse (named TRPF-H3).  
 
EXPERIMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
 
A test area with the following characteristics was needed to provide a 
reasonable simulation environment in which to conduct the traverse tests: (a) 
relatively large area (many square kilometers), preferably free of vegetation, human-
built obstructions (e.g., fences, roads, etc.), or other ground cover (e.g., snow, ice, 
etc.); (b) terrain features and topography representative of the lunar South Pole region 
being simulated in these tests; and (c) areas in which a traverse could be successfully 
carried out as well as areas in which these activities could clearly not be carried out to 
determine the test teams’ ability to distinguish between the two. The region around 
the HMPRS on Devon Island, Nunavut, Canada, possessed these features and 
therefore was selected for these tests. The remaining activities in this experiment 
were implemented in four parts: 
Part 1  Definition of the analog traverse waypoints by the principal investigator 
(PI), the available remote observation datasets, and other constraints for planning 
the traverse. The PI established a start point and an endpoint for the simulated 
traverse; these two points are separated by a straight-line distance of just over 17 
kilometers (11 miles; ~15 percent of the straight-line distance between Shackleton 
Crater and Malapert Massif). Eight waypoints were inserted between the start point 
and endpoint of the simulated traverse. These waypoints are meant to simulate points 
of interest that could have been introduced for science reasons or operations reasons 
(e.g., a high point in which solar illumination was available). But the process by 
which these waypoints would have been selected was not part of the simulation and 
therefore will not be further discussed. (Note: There is also a practical reason for 
including these waypoints: to provide a prominent landmark for the person on the 
ground to find independent of latitude/longitude should there be any issue with 
map/image ties with the remote observation data sets being used.) The cumulative 
straight-line distance between all eight of these waypoints is 22.7 kilometer. 
The following datasets were selected by the PI for use by the planning team: (a) 
satellite and air photographs (equivalent to ~1 to 2 meter/pixel); (b) topographic maps 
(10-meter elevation contour) and digital elevation model (DEM) maps (selected 
areas); and (c) satellite radar imaging (25 meter/pixel resolution). All of these data 
were imported into Google Inc.’s Google® Earth (GE) tool as the general planning 
environment. 
Part 2  Selection of a traverse route and required ground observations by a 
route planning team (six people). The traverse path and photographs to be taken were 
done in a four-step process. 
Step 1: Using material (i.e., remote observation data) provided to the planning 
team, team members were asked to determine the shortest route that could be 
traversed by all elements of the convoy. If the planning team was fairly sure, but not 
completely convinced, that the particular route was feasible, team members were 
asked to prepare a possible alternate route to bypass the questionable area. The 
planning team documented the routing as a set of additional waypoints between those 
selected by the PI. The group was also asked to assign a trafficability rating to the 
selected route using a set of defined categories. 
Step 2: With the traverse path determined, the planning team was asked to 
decide which ground-level photographs along the primary route are needed to 
confirm that the path picked is passable. The planning team was advised to take into 
account turns, possibly hidden depressions, and rocky terrain in determining the 
ground-level photographs needed. The group documented these photograph requests 
as a set of locations (latitude, longitude), bearing, and field of view (FOV) size for 
each photograph. 
Step 3: The team was asked to revisit the path selected and determine whether 
there are locations in which use of a point of perspective would be useful (e.g., to 
check an alternate route or to provide a view not from the traverse path). Again, the 
team was asked to document these photograph requests as a set of locations (latitude, 
longitude), bearing, and FOV size for each photograph. 
Step 4: Iterate through the first three steps until a consensus was reached. This 
was not as much a planned step as an immediate lesson learned, in that the planning 
team members put forward several different paths, each considered “reasonable” or 
“safe” by one or more of the team members. Discussion of the rationale behind these 
alternatives led to an iterative process to reach a consensus path.  Figure 1 shows the 
eight-waypoint traverse route, with some of the local deviations visible (better detail 
is available in Hoffman, et.al., 2011). 
Part 3  Gathering of the ground observations on Devon Island. The third part of 
the experiment consisted of the PI traveling the route laid out by the planning team to 
gather the requested photographs and document the ground truth. The PI obtained the 
photographs, tagged them with Global Positioning System (GPS) coordinates, and 
transmitted them from the HMPRS base camp to NASA’s Future Flight Central 
(FFC) facility at the Ames Research Center (ARC), which was used by the planning 
team during Part 4 of the experiment. The PI also noted and documented ground-truth 
data regarding terrain characteristics along the planned route, in particular whether 
 
Figure 1. Traverse route for the 2010 field experiments 
the planned route 
was “safe” for all 
vehicles to follow 
considering rocks or 
slope as well as the 
trafficability of the 
route. 
When the PI 
believed the route 
was unsafe for the 
convoy or thought 
the traverse team 
may perceive a 
problem, the PI took 
additional 
photographs that 
might help the 
groups resolve the 
situation. These 
additional 
photographs were 
only taken as a time-
saving measure, 
anticipating the 
team would request such a photograph during the execution phase. During the 
execution phase, the traverse team would only be allowed to view the photographs if 
the team members requested a photograph that matched one of the photographs the PI 
took. 
Part 4  Simulation of the planned traverse using the data gathered on Devon 
Island (but previously transmitted and stored at ARC due to communications 
limitations) and any real-time data requests. The final part of the experiment was to 
“execute” the traverse. The images and GE view along the planned route on Devon 
Island were presented to the traverse teams on displays in the FFC (see Figure 2); the 
primary image was also shown on WebEx® (Cisco Technology, Inc.) for remote team 
member(s). The images were displayed no faster than the nominal ground-ruled speed 
of the traverse (i.e., 5 km/h, which is 72 seconds per image for images 100 meters 
apart). For each image displayed, the traverse team decided and recorded whether the 
route was passable for the segment represented by the image and determined the 
terrain trafficability category. Because slope is part of trafficability, the traverse team 
was also provided with the ground-truth slope at the position of the photograph. 
At locations at which the planning team had previously determined an alternate 
route might be needed, the traverse team was presented images of both the primary 
and the alternate route from that location. The traverse team then determined whether 
the two images provided sufficient information to select one route over the other. In 
cases in which there was no clear advantage of one route over the other route, the 
traverse team was instructed to continue on the primary route. 
 
Figure 2. Simulated remote driving station at NASA ARC FFC. The two images 
on the right are examples of surface-level imagery sent to the traverse planning 
team.  The image on the left is the GE view of the photograph location with the 
traverse route overlaid on the surface image. 
When the team came across a section of route that they determined was 
impassable, two scenarios could come into play depending on the situation: 
• If team members had already determined that this section might be a problem, 
the team would have already planned an alternate route. In this case, the team would 
back up to the start of the alternate route and proceed on that alternate route. 
• If there was no alternate route or all alternate routes had been exhausted, the 
team members were asked to plan an alternate route “on the fly.” Originally, the plan 
had been to allow the traverse team to request additional imagery at the “current” 
traverse location. The PI on Devon Island would have taken this additional imagery in 
real time and sent it back in near-real time. However, weather conditions at Devon 
Island did not allow for this scenario. Consequently, the test director in the FFC used 
the ground-truth notes and additional imagery previously sent by the PI to make 
rulings on proposed alternate routes. 
The time spent evaluating and discussing each imagery location and the 
discussions concerning alternate routes were recorded by the test director. 
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS FOR THE 2010 FIELD TESTS 
 
During this experiment, and the analysis and discussion of the data from it, the 
team made the following observations and came to the following conclusions: 
TRPF-H1.  Remote observation data are insufficient to plan a definitive route 
that is completely free of undetected obstacles that would stop vehicles of the type 
assumed here. Sections of the planned route were impassable. The primary type of 
obstacle encountered was steep terrain – cliffs, large outcrops, steep slopes, etc. (see 
photographs on the right of Figure 2). While remote observation data were marginal 
for detection of obstacles such as rocks, there were no sections that were impassable 
due to rocks alone. 
TRPF-H2.  Surface-level imagery, which provided a significant improvement 
in the knowledge of the route, was required to complete the traverse. All of the major 
obstacles were identifiable in the surface-level imagery. While some of marginal 
cases were not immediately seen, they likely would have been detected had real-time, 
full-motion, surface-level imagery been available. As with the remote observation 
data, determination of slopes was the most difficult problem to detect and evaluate. 
TRPF-H3.  The original proposed field test involving multiple views was not 
implemented due to several issues in the field (see TRPF-H3 introduction). However, 
based on some limited opportunistic data, it appears there is a concern that it may take 
too long for the remote “drivers” to correlate multiple views. Additional work needs 
to be done on exactly how multiple views would be used and how imagery can be 
quickly correlated. But given the overall results from this opportunistic experiment, 
any additional work in this area should be considered low priority. 
General Observations. Although the surface imagery was sufficient to carry 
out the experiment, the “driving” and evaluation of the route would have been much 
easier if additional information had been directly available to help interpret the 
photographs. Examples include the following: 
(a) Distance or size cues are clearly needed in the photographs. This could be 
achieved either by projecting additional information on the photographs or having or 
projecting known cues into the scene when the imagery is taken. Use of video instead 
of still imagery (an implementation limitation in this experiment) would have given 
some additional distance/size cues, but it is unclear whether those cues would have 
been sufficient. Another approach would be to use a scanning range-finding device 
(e.g., a laser) to determine distance and then overlay the results on the imagery. 
(b) Slope measurements need to account for cross-track slopes. The original 
planning analysis only calculated slopes along the direction of travel. The ground 
truth showed that there were several locations in which the cross-track slope was 
significant – in some cases, much steeper than the slope along the direction of travel. 
(c) There needs to be a more automated mechanism to display imagery and 
additional metadata from the remote site that the team executing the traverse is 
allowed to see. For example, the slopes measured at the surface-level imagery 
location should be displayed with the photographs. Similarly, better software support 
for the use of multiple screens would allow both the current and the previous 
photograph to be displayed and changed with a single command. Overlay of the route 
on the photograph would be useful. The vast majority of the routes should have been 
straight ahead for the next segment. The evaluators mentioned that the overlay would 
still be useful to see upcoming turns past the next point. 
(d) Acknowledging that the use of multiple still images for this experiment was 
the result of logistical constraints, if this approach were to be used for an actual 
traverse, the traverse team determined that a distance of 100 meters between surface 
imagery locations was too large. The team was usually looking or concentrating on 
the next 25 to 50 meters. While the photographs were taken at a resolution that 
allowed zooming, the additional time needed to zoom in the images was usually not 
taken. Several locations on hills (especially the descending side) and even flat areas 
with minor local rises (2 to 3 meters) led to part of the route not being visible in the 
photograph. Although ground truth showed these were not problem areas, it did lead 
to loss of situational awareness and increased evaluation times. Thus, given the 
bandwidth limitation for this experiment and the manner in which the teams used the 
photographs, more frequent but lower-resolution images would have probably worked 
better than less frequent but higher-resolution images. 
 
FOLLOW-UP FIELD TEST IN 2011 
 
During 2011 an opportunity arose to apply some of the lessons learned from the 
2010 traverse experiment as well as gather additional data to help answer several of 
the identified difficulties. An AM General LLC Humvee® (or formally high-mobility 
multipurpose wheeled vehicle [HMMWV]) was to be moved from the west coast of 
Devon Island to the HMPRS, a distance of approximately 75 kilometers. A route was 
needed for this traverse across this area that had not been previously visited by 
anyone on the driving team. Three objectives were set for this 2011 experiment, each 
associated with a lesson learned or an observation from the 2010 experiment: 
(1) Continue to refine the traverse planning process by including additional data 
(i.e., the slope map) and by planning longer routes through unexplored terrain. 
(2) Obtain ground-truth imagery at intervals much less than the 100-meter 
interval used during 2010 to understand the improvement in (a) situational awareness 
during a supervised robotic traverse and (b) to improve local replanning should an 
obstacle or hazard be encountered. 
(3) Understand the impacts of obtaining surface-level imagery from a location 
higher than and lower than that used in the 2010 experiment. 
Data sets used for planning this traverse were comparable to those used in 2010 
but with the addition of a slope map. This slope map used the local DEM data to 
calculate the maximum slope at each point in this region. The slope data became 
another factor in selecting a “safe” route. The resulting traverse route is shown in 
Figure 3. This route had a total distance of approximately 90 kilometers. One 
potential problem was noted near the beginning of the traverse, resulting in a planned 
alternate route in that area. 
Four cameras were mounted on the Humvee (see Figure 4) – one camera at 
approximately eye level to produce photographs from a perspective comparable to 
that of the 2010 experiment, one camera somewhat lower level to approximate a 
small robotic scout, and a pair of cameras on top of the Humvee for a perspective 
approximating the view from the top of a small pressurized rover as well as providing 
a three-dimensional view. Photographs were taken at five-second intervals so that at a 
nominal speed of 10 - 15 km/h the photograph data set would be at an interval of 
approximately 15 – 20 meters. 
An all-terrain vehicle (ATV) performed the role of a small scout rover to (a) 
locate a precise route between waypoints, (b) help locate soft ground, and (c) provide 
the suggested size cue in photographs. This ATV was typically 100 meters in front of 
the Humvee. A suspected obstacle early in the traverse was in fact real, so the 
alternate path was used. In addition, five additional unidentified obstacles were 
encountered during the remainder of the traverse. All of these obstacles were slope 
features that would have been too steep for the criteria stated in the original 
experiment. A safe path around these features was typically located within a few tens 
 
Figure 3. The 2011 traverse (85 kilometer; shown in blue) with the 2010 traverse 
(primary and alternates shown in yellow and green, respectively) for comparison. 
of meters from the baseline path. A significant amount of soft ground caused by 
snowmelt was also encountered but was not recorded as an obstacle. The total 
distance driven, including all deviations from slope and soft-ground obstacles, was 
102 kilometers, a 16 percent increase over the planned route. 
A total of 65,544 photographs were collected from all four cameras, with an 
additional 3,232 context photographs from other cameras. Of these 24,361 
photographs were collected while the vehicles were moving and form the database 
from which comparative analyses identified in the 2010 experiment will be made. 
These analyses are still under way. However, several conclusions can be drawn from 
the results already gathered. 
For the TRPF-H1 hypothesis, the data set used was sufficient to plan a traverse 
without encountering an obstacle that could not be maneuvered around within a few 
tens of meters. The number of unidentified obstacles encountered was somewhat 
lower per kilometer of planned traverse but still not zero. The revised version of the 
slope map was somewhat useful but the resolution of the data from which it was 
constructed needs to be significantly higher (on par with the image resolution) for this 
to be a useful planning tool. 
For the TRPF-H2 hypothesis, the increased frequency of the photographs 
definitely improved situational awareness and a five-second interval may be sufficient 
for this type of teleoperated driving when compared to continuous video.  Having an 
object of known size, such as the ATV, in the field of view also provides a much 
better sense of scale, slope and distance. The advantages and disadvantages of high 
versus low camera positions and stereo versus mono images are still under analysis so 
no conclusions can be offered. 
 
Figure 4. Camera locations for 2011 traverse follow up experiments 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Several analog experiments have been conducted to better understand the 
process and required data sets needed for a teleoperated robotic traverse across 
planetary surfaces as proposed y the ISECG. Results to date indicate that remotely 
sensed data sets comparable to those already in hand for the Moon (and to a more 
limited extent for Mars) coupled with surface-level imagery should also be sufficient 
for actually driving planned traverse routes. Characteristics of the surface-level 
imagery required is still being assessed, but preliminary results indicate that discrete 
images obtained at a frequency to update the situational view every 10 to 20 meters 
should be sufficient. 
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